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1 Introduction 
The general focus of this study is to investigate the decision to invest in food safety as a field of 
connection between public and private strategies. The objective if the study is to investigate how the 
legislation pressure influence the decision to invest in food safety systems. The basic idea is to 
conceptualize the allocation of the decision right to invest among the transaction party, counterparty 
and regulator as a source of drivers of investments. While the allocation of the decision rights is 
recognized as the key factor in coping with uncertainty (Gibbons, 2005), it is also here held as term of 
the micro-foundations of the organizational arrangements (Grandori, Furnari, 2008). 
Food companies and agricultural farms pay a great and necessary attention to technologies and 
economic relationships and arrangements aimed at enhancing and ensuring the due degree of products 
safety. In all the chain stages, adequate technologies are needed in order to carry out the productive 
process according to the best prerequisites identified by health and food sciences. Policy interventions 
intended to prevent food safety crisis have shaped the institutional environment of food systems 
channelling the companies strategies and have induced, with the technological requirements, the raise 
of complex organizational forms (Hobbs, 2002; Mènard and Valceschini, 2005). The food chain actors 
elaborate complex strategies in which technological and organizational choices and institutional 
commitments assure the food safety level demanded by public and private safety regulations and 
strategies.  
Although the process depicted has been widely investigated under economic and organizational views, a 
lack of knowledge still remains about the determinants of the investment in food safety strategic 
choices. There are several drivers of food safety oriented investments.  
In the empirical investigation we consider the influence of the law and economic drivers 
separately for the following food safety risks management systems: HACCP, certification, geographical 
indications and brand. The knowledge of such an influence provides a better comprehension of the 
micro-level motivations of food safety strategies adopted and help to understand specific characteristics 
of the Agri-food governance modes and could favour the elaboration of policy intervention.  
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section we introduce the analytical framework. The 
data analysis approach and the empirical results are presented and discussed in the sections three. The 
last paragraph is dedicated to conclusions. 
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2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Coordination and information issues and uncertainty 
The choice of the efficient governance structure allows the agents to carry out the planned transaction 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991). Namely the transaction parties seek to align the attributes of the transaction – 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency – to the characteristics of the governance structure 
(Williamson, 1991, Masten, 2000; Mènard, 2005). Normally, quality and safety strategies in Agri-Food 
Chains require to make highly specific investments and to deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty 
exacerbates  the effect of asset specificity in choosing  more centralized governance structure 
(Williamson, 1991) and determine the necessity to adapt the governance mode (Mènard, 2004) to 
unforeseen contingencies (Williamson, 1991, Gibbons, 2005; Gibbon et al., 2013). As a consequence 
hybrid governance modes became largely diffused (Mènard, Valceschini, 2005; Martino, Perugini, 2005).  
 Coordination issues influence the safety performance of the food systems. The safety level of food 
products supplied depends on the behaviour of all agents involved in the food chain. This is because the 
source of accidents - chemical, physical, microbiological, etc. - may occur at any stage of the system and 
because remedies and precautions intentionally implemented may fail due to technological flaws or 
human errors. Thus the safe foods provision involves  the choice of appropriate forms of governance 
able to guarantee the expected objectives. The safety level is an outcome of the coordination designed 
by the chain agents (Martino, Perugini, 2006; Lupien, 2005; Charlier, Valceschini, 2008; Hammoudi et al., 
2009).  
The most of the safety characteristics are credence in nature (Hobbs, 2002) therefore an unavoidable 
information asymmetry arises among the chains partners. The market failure determined by the 
information asymmetry is an important cause of public intervention (Unnehever, Jensen, 1999). Public 
intervention takes different forms characterized by various specific objectives and intensity (Garcia-
Martinez et al., 2007; Henson, Holt, 2000). Likewise, the information asymmetry is a further important 
issue to be taken into consideration. Furthermore the unequal distribution of information about food 
products characteristics requires the agents to design and to implement mechanisms to gather and to 
channel information and to carry out dedicated activities.  
Coordination and information issues motivate the critical importance of the organization arrangements 
for the supply of safe food. To design effective coordination arrangements requires to cope with 
uncertainty (Mènard, 2005). Information asymmetries exacerbates the influence of uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1991).  
In sum, on the one  hand effective food safety provision systems (Haccp, Certification, Traceability, 
Certification etc) are based upon or provide organizational solutions of both coordination and 
information issues; on the other hand, technological and behavioural uncertainty require the agents to 
allocate resources to food safety systems intended to channel information along the chain and to favour 
the coordination among the agents (Hammaudi et al., 2009; Hirschauer, Zwoll, 2008; Hobbs, 2004; 
Mènard, Valceschini, 2005; Dosman et al., 2001; Unnevher, Jenson, 1999).  We then consider the 
investments in food safety systems both as economic instruments to implement safety strategy and as 
elements related to organizational choices. In the following we elaborate on these points by focusing on 
the allocation of decision rights as critical step in building up effective safety provision systems. 
2.3 Public intervention and allocation of decision rights  
The necessity of copying with risks emerging in food chain determined the building up of complex 
regulatory frameworks (Majone, 2010; Szajkowska, 2009). During the recent decades an intensive 
change of the institutional framework has been implemented at both national and international level in 
order to enhance and to ensure the degree of safety of the food products (Fulponi, 2006; Lupien, 2005; 
Yapp, Fairman, 2006; Garcia-Martinez et al., 2007; Henson, Holt, 2000). The agri-food chain coordination 
patterns progressively change under the inducements of the co-regulation approaches (Garcia-Martinez 
et al., 2007) as well as the increasing influence of the food standards’ adoption (Swinnen, 
Vandermoortele, 2009; Hammoudi et al., 2009; Trienekes, Zuurbider, 2008). The implementation of 
safety oriented activities is associated with monitoring and controlling while signalling to consumers and 
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chain partners the degree of safety of the products delivered is a critical strategic tool (Elbash, Riggs, 
2003; Golan et al., 2001). Beyond the compliance with the law, agents have identified specific objectives 
that concern private standards (Hobbs et al., 2002; Trail, Koening, 2010; Hammoudi et al., 2009; 
Henson, Reardon, 2006; Trienekens, Zuurbier, 2008), complex information management systems  
(Charlier, Valceschini, 2008; Heyder et al., 2012) and signalling devices (Hatanaka et al., 2005; Golan, 
2003; Konefal, Hatanaka, 2011).  
The alignment of the behaviour of the agents, is a critical an instrument  to cope with technological and 
behavioural uncertainty (Hirschauer, Mussoff, 2006). Our approach elaborates on the idea that the 
allocation of the decision rights is the tool to sustain the achievements of safety requisites. Theory 
states that in order to cope with uncertainty the parties negotiate ex ante the allocation of the critical 
decision rights to the party who is expected to maximize the total surplus (Gibbons, 2005; Gibbns et al.  
2013). Although the parties could not anticipate at the time of the contract outset all the future specific 
necessities which may rise due to inherent uncertainty of food safety, they may decide how to face 
these necessities by allocating the critical decision rights at the time of the negotiation of the 
governance structure. Drawing from Gibbons (2005) we contend that the coordination pattern among 
two parties in the chain may follow the following timing:  
 
 
.  
 
 
Figure 1. Allocation of decision rights about food safety private strategy and timing of implementation  
The figure 1 indicates that the choice of the governance mode allows the parties to coordinate 
themselves  to the purpose of safety provision. The allocation of the decision rights is aimed at allowing 
the parties to achieve the largest surplus, provided the uncertainty influence (Gibbons, 2005; 
Williamson, 1991). We contend that the relevant rights set includes also the right to decide the 
investments required to design and implement the investments needed to set up the safety provision 
systems. 
Many factors inducing the adoption of food safety standards can have an effect on the allocation of the 
decision rights. In general, the compliance with law (Henson, Holt, 2000) limits the freedom of contract 
of the parties and modifies their degree of freedom in the decision making process. The external 
pressure caused by the chain partners or final consumers (Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008) has a similar 
impact. The size of the firm can influence the adoption of standards (Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008) and 
can interfere on the allocation of the decision rights because of its relation with the capability of the 
firm to implement safety system (Yapp, Fairman, 2006). These factor interact with the internal 
motivation of the firm, the objective to strengthen the market position (Zaiber, Bredhal, 1997), the 
search for a premium price (Zhou et al., 2011) and for scale economies (Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008, p. 
120), and the reduction of the transaction costs (Henson, Northern, 1998; Loader, Hobbs, 1999).  
Public intervention and private strategies set up a complex network of rules and incentives aimed at 
achieving an enhanced degree of food safety (Garcia  Martinez et al., 2007). Food safety rules have 
influence upon the decision rights concerning the process implementation, the enforcement, and the 
monitoring and controlling activities as well as the design of entire food safety systems. The parties to a 
transaction may agree upon a given allocation of decision rights in order to achieve the higher efficiency 
possible in coping with uncertainty. Nonetheless, based on the comparison of benefits and costs of 
effective safety strategies (Antle, 1999; Garcia Martinez et al., 2007), the policy intervention may 
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delimitate the right to decide the allocation of decision rights and may also force the parties to a adopt a 
given allocation. 
2.4 Food safety investments drivers 
To the purposes of our analysis, we distinguish the right to decide the allocation of the decision right to 
invest from the decision right to invest.  If the public regulation prohibits to carry out a given productive 
operation, then none of the parties to a transaction can carry out that operation: none of the party will 
invest to the purpose of that operation.  If the public regulation constrains a party to carry out the given 
operation, then the party has to invest and none can decide how to allocate the decision right to carry 
out the operation. Therefore it seems that public prohibitions and prescriptions share a common 
general trait, actually both of them deprive the parties of the right to decide the allocation of decision 
rights related to the objective of the public intervention.  
In terms of decision rights, then, the first effect of the public intervention we consider is to deprive or 
not the private agents to decide the allocation of decision rights. The figure 2 illustrates the investments 
drivers we identified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Identification of the investments drivers 
In the first case,  the critical decision could be made by public officers or by private agents but strictly 
according to public prescriptions or prohibitions. As a consequence the investment decision would be 
made by the force of the law. This is the field of compliance with the legislation. The second case is that 
grounded upon the freedom of contract: the parties will behave according to the model depicted in 
Figure 1. On the other hand, buyers and consumers expectations could induce companies to invest in 
order to ensure and to enhance the degree of safety of the products. In other words, if the law does not 
deprive the parties of the right to decide the allocation of the decision right to invest, then free 
decisions can be made. The parties have thus the freedom to make investments to the purposes of 
safety performance and surplus maximization. The party to a transaction could decide to maintain the 
decision right to invest as she expect to maximize the total surplus of the transaction. The autonomy – 
that is the capacity and willingness to act by herself - is thus an additional investments driver often 
crucial in the implementation of marketing plan based on safety and quality (Martino, Perugini, 2006, 
Fulponi, 2006). Moreover, to deal with the coordination and information food safety management issue, 
a party may decide to allocate to the counterparty the right to invest, in such a case the investment will 
be made under the directions of the partners which is then the third driver we identify. 
If the decision about the allocation of the decision right to invest can be freely made according to the 
complete freedom of the private agents, the parties will choose the efficient allocation of the decision 
rights to invest (Gibbons, 2005). Therefore, under the point of view of a transaction party, we 
distinguish two cases: a) the decision rights is fully exerted according to the liberty of the transaction 
party, we label “Autonomy” this case; b) the decision right is allocated to the transaction counterparty 
(“Partner directions”).  We operationalize this conceptual approach by two steps (par. 2.3): we firstly 
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introduce a selection hypothesis intended to capture the influence of the policy interventions on the 
decision patterns and then we identify the types of investments drivers.  
3 Empirical study 
According to Loader and Hobbs (1999) food safety investments are expected to be made in all the 
critical areas of firm activities. We considered a wide definition of food safety system, namely we 
consider all the system based on the qualification of the production processes or the product paying 
explicit attention to safety.  
We consider five basic organizational systems that have been developed to achieve food safety and food 
quality objectives: Haccp system, which provides the basic possibilities to implement the right 
technology; Certification, which integrates the search for signalling objectives and the organizational 
innovation  (Unnevehr and Jenson, 1999; Crespi & Marette, 2001); Geographic Indications, which 
require the producers on the supply side to comply with specific rules and, on the demand side, are able 
to channel adequate information toward consumers (Louriero, Umberger, 2007); Brand, which are used 
to signal of quality and safety characteristics even though consumers seem to prefer public labelling 
(Roosen et al., 2003); Traceability which facilitates the management of supply chain by the possibility of 
identifying liabilities by enhancing the efficiency of control activities (Heyder et al., 2012; Starbird, 
Amanor-Boadu, 2006; Hobbs et al., 2005; Hobbs, 2004) and supporting trasparency (Beulens et al. 
2005). 
3.1 Method of analysis  
How does the relationship between the allocation of the decision right to invest work in the context of a 
strong legislation pressure? Consider the case in which paradoxically any legislation existed on food 
safety, the parties to a transaction would have the convenience to decide the allocation of the decision 
right to invest in order to cope with uncertainty and coordinate themselves. Of course we cannot 
observe the allocation of decision rights impact in the case of absence of legislation, because it is not 
real. We only can observe farms and companies which are under the legislation pressure as the safety is 
a pre-requisite of the food. Therefore, observing the real farms and companies we may not be able to 
capture completely the relation between the allocation of the decision rights and the investment 
decision concerning the necessity to cope with uncertainty in food safety context. In other words, we 
are observing a “decision making space” in which both law and free willingness could operate as 
determinants of the allocation of decision right to invest. Asking agents to declare what are the drivers 
of the investments they made, we are sampling decisions in that “decision making space” and the 
decisions sampled may be not representative, if the logical possibility exists that the decision to allocate 
the decision right is made regardless to law (this is for example the case of the supply of meat-food for 
kids). Actually the investment decision right could have been allocated without law pressure, but as we 
can only observe decision made in law pressure context, it makes sense to make the hypothesis of 
selection. 
Furthermore, the food safety investments may span from the simply change of the way to carry out an 
unique productive operation to the set up of complex traceability or certification systems. Asking agents 
to declare if they have invested exploring this very large field would provide answers not fully 
comparable. A focus on system is needed, in order to capture comparable behaviors. Unfortunately, the 
system view, includes several possible motivation including the competing quality and safety aims. 
Both the two reasons illustrated motivates a selection bias. In order to test for the selection hypothesis 
discussed above, the method of data analysis is based on the estimation of a bivariate probit model with 
sample selection (Greene, 2008). The model includes a selection equation and an outcome equation. 
The selection equation accounts for the decision based on the utility of undertaking the change under 
the inducements of the legislation pressure. The change process indicates that the farm/company of the 
respondent reacted to the food safety legislation pressure. In this context, decisions to invest could have 
been made which are of the interest in the present study. In other words, 
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(1)                       111
*
1 εα += XY  
where: 
*
1Y is a latent variable which refers to the utility to undertake the change, mainly related to the 
compliance with the law (Hirschauer, Zwoll, 2011); 
α is a vector of unknown parameters; 
1X is a a vector of exogenous variables;  
1ε is the error terms. 
The outcome equation expresses the decision based on the utility of making the investments, having 
undertaken the change under the inducements of the general law pressure: 
(2)                       222
*
2 εβ += XY  
where: 
*
2Y is a latent variable which refers to the utility to undertake the change; 
β is a vector of unknown parameters; 
X2 is a vector of exogenous variables;  
2 is the error terms. 
The decision patterns summarized by the equation (1) and (2) can be depicted as follows (see also 
Signorino, 2002): 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                             0
*
1 =Y  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Investments decision pattern 
 
 
Of course, we only can observe the decisions made when the latent variables are larger than 0. 
Our approach to empirical analysis focuses on how the three drivers considered influence the 
probability to invest. Each of the drivers considered may have the same (positive, negative) or a 
different impact on that probability for all the types of investments taken into account. If the impacts on 
the three types of investments have the same (different) sign, then we conclude that inducements of 
each driver (Law, Autonomy, Partner directions) converge (diverge) toward the same effect, increasing 
(decreasing) of the probability to invest. Our method of data analysis focuses on  association. The 
convergence (divergence) in terms of types of investments regards how  the impact of each driver is 
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associated to each type of investments. The convergence (divergence) in terms of drivers concerns with 
how for each investments the drivers associate themselves.  The types of association of the drivers, with 
respect to each investments highlights instead how public interventions and private strategy combine 
themselves.  
3.2 Data 
The empirical analysis was carried out gathering data by using the data base built on in 2005-2006 by 
through a postal questionnaire submitted to 2036 Italian companies. The postal address were achieved 
from Posteitaliane – the company managing mail services at national level – and the selection of the 
companies was carried out by the unique criterion of “Field of activity”. The companies selected were 
active in the field of animal products supply and were engaged in various stages of food chains (i.e., 
agricultural, processing and just trading activities).    
The Italian meat sector includes several branches of activities spanning from farm stages production to 
distribution activities. The sector is based upon a variety of organizational forms strongly influenced by 
the quality and safety policies and a large diffusion of certified products. The main branches of activities 
are the bovine, the pork and the poultry (see Table 1 for details). The policy intervention strongly 
influenced the organization of the sector. Changes occurred in order to face the BSE crisis and the avian 
flu. Nevertheless, the sector is characterize by the prevalence of vertical integration in poultry industry 
and by the diffusion of contractual relationships (among farmers and processors, and processors and 
retailers) in bovine and pork industry. These variety motivates a different approach in dealing with 
safety strategies. 
The instrument used in our inquiry includes three sections: a) general information about the company, 
including the date of establishing, the size and the field of activities (production, trade); b) the 
relationships with other enterprises in the chains, the section focus of the type of contract (verbal, 
written, brief term, long terms) and related decision (procurement, selling, duration), the information 
related are not presented here, but are part of a further investigation; c) the activities undertaken in the 
field of food safety: the information concern with the typo of systems implemented (Haccp, 
Certification, Brand, Geographical Indication, Traceability, none) and the investments made in order to 
support the system built on (physical resources, human resources, additional costs); further information 
concern with: the sources of information on safety, the implementation of specific hygiene practices 
and the internal safety  
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Table 1. 
Some characteristics of the Ialian meat sector 
             
      
  
u.m. 2008 2009 2010 
            
      Bovine 
     
 
N. of farms (000) 93 93 93 
 
Head slaughtered (000) 1869 1882 1890 
 
Meat supply (Mil Euros) 1057 1049 1069 
 
Sales (Mil Euros) 5900 5900 5900 
 
Import (Mil Euros) 3122 3138 3336 
      Pork 
     
 
N. of farms (000) - - 26 
 
Head slaughtered (000) - - - 
 
Meat supply (Mil Euros) 1606 1628 1673 
 
Sales (Mil Euros) 7578 7601 7928 
 
Import (Mil Euros) 1839 1765 1972 
      Poultry 
     
 
N. of farms (000) - - 11117 
 
Head slaughtered (000) - - - 
 
Meat supply (Mil Euros) 1237 1247 1319 
 
Sales (Mil Euros) 5300 5320 5300 
 
Import (Mil Euros) 146 131 163 
            
Source: Ismea (2012) 
     
3.3 Variables 
There are many studies considering different aspects of the organisational systems of food safety 
management in various settings. Karaman et al. (2012) investigated the managers’ opinions about Haccp 
in Turkish dairy. The additional costs and the lack of adequate physical conditions were ranked at the 
first position among the barriers limiting the diffusion of Haccp system. Economic incentives and the 
necessity to comply with the law are identified as the main goals to be achieved through the 
implementation of Haccp. Wilckok et al. (2011) propose similar motivation for the adoption of food 
safety systems, including Haccp. According to the received literature (Acemoglu,1996; Lepak and Snell, 
2002) the human resources are recognized as the main requirement for the implementation of an 
effective food safety system (Wilcock et al., 2011, pp. 29 ff.). By an extensive analysis Herath and 
Henson (2010) found out that the main obstacle to diffusion of Haccp would be the financial constraints 
while confirming that the consumers’ requests act as the great inducement to adopt. Notably they 
pointed out that the size of the company appears to be not influent.  
Collins and Burt (2006) show that brand strategy requires both the parties to a dyad relationship to 
make specific investments (but they do not emphasize the allocation of decision rights). Quetier et al. 
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(2005) found out that typical cheese producers modified the land use and the genotypes improvements 
strategies in order to enhance their compliance with Geographical Indication production rules. Heyder 
et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive analysis of the traceability implementing and management in the 
lens of the technology acceptance model. Their results showed that the costs caused by the 
management of the traceability systems negatively influence the choice to adopt them, while the 
intention to invest has a positive role in the diffusion of these systems. Further scholars underlined the 
necessity to face increased costs caused by the adoption of the food safety systems (Seggerson,1999; 
Henson, Reordan, 2001; Antle; 2000). In this context, although the investments in food safety may 
consist in material resources, human resources and in organisational activities, scholars recognize that 
human resources, staff skills and training and information technologies are the most prominent 
resources sustaining food safety systems. This circumstance implies that human resources and 
additional costs are expected to be more diffused investments made in order to support food safety 
strategies. Nevertheless, physical resources appear to maintain a role, even though associated to the 
technological and management changes (Herat et al. 2011; Heyder et al., 2012).  
To the purpose of the empirical analysis we therefore considered three types of investment mentioned 
for each system: a) physical resources; b) human resources; c) additional costs of the internal 
organizational activities.  The variables utilized in the analysis are illustrated in Table 2 
The code (0,1) indicates as usual the presence/absence of the variable. Thus in the case of investments 
the value 1 indicates that the respondents declared she invested. In the case of the driver, the value 1  
indicates that the respondent recognized the influence of that driver. 
The Beliefs  variables capture the influence upon behaviours (decision to invest) that accounts for the 
general views of the respondents about the food safety strategies. According to literature, we identified 
three prominent beliefs: the compliance with law (Loader, Hobbs, 1999; Henson, Holt, 2000; Antle, 
2000; Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008); the expectations about the profitability in terms of number of 
clients and sales (Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008; Segerson, 1999; Gorris, 2005; Zhou et al., 2012);  and of 
premium price for the certainty of the safety degree (Loader, Hobs, 1999; Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008; 
Fares, Rouviere, 2010).  
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Table 2. 
Variables description and coding 
 
Variable Symbol Code 
Investments   
Physical Resources (Haccp, Certification, Geographical Indications, Private 
Brands, Traceability) 
PR  
(Haccp, 
Cert, Gi, 
Brand, 
Trace) 
0, 1 
Human Resources (Haccp, Certification, Geographical Indications, Private 
Brands, Traceability) 
HU 
(Haccp, 
Cert, Gi, 
Brand, 
Trace) 
0, 1 
Additional Costs (Haccp, Certification, Geographical Indications, Private 
Brands, Traceability) 
CO 
(Haccp, 
Cert, Gi, 
Brand, 
Trace) 
0,1  
Investment Drivers   
Law Law 0, 1 
Autonomy Auton 0, 1 
Partner directions Partndir 0,1  
Beliefs   
 
 
To ensure food safety is a law duty 
Law_duty I completely disagree -2 
I disagree -1 
I do not know 0 
I agree 1 
I completely disagree 2 
 
 
To ensure food safety increases the number of clients and the sales 
 
 
Custom 
I completely disagree -2 
I disagree -1 
I do not know 0 
I agree 1 
I completely disagree 2 
 
 
To ensure food safety increases the prices of the products 
 
Price 
I completely disagree -2 
I disagree -1 
I do not know 0 
I agree 1 
I completely disagree 2 
Sources of information    
Technicians Tech 0, 1 
Public Health officials Asl 0, 1 
Advertsing Publ 0, 1 
Other entrepreneurs Enterpr 0, 1 
Control variables   
Number of high level managers, as index of the capability to cope with 
technological uncertainty; 
 
Ndir Number 
Year of experience of the top manager, as index of the capability to cope 
with technological uncertainty; 
 
 
Exper  
      < 5 years 
 6 – 15 years 
  16-25 years 
    < 25 years 
Volume of sales as an index of the size of the firm; 
 
Sales                 0-100.000 Eur/year 
      101.000-500.000 Eur/year 
   501.000-1.000.000 Eur/year 
 1001.000-5.000.000 Eur/year 
more than 5.000.000 Eur/year 
Dichotomous variable, indicating the stage of activity of the firm 
(production = 1; distribution = 0). 
 
Prod 0, 1 
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Each source of information  has a specific effect. Technicians  are here intended to be associated with 
the chain relationships (the connection between poultry companies and farmers under contract, for 
example, is normally guaranteed by the company’s technicians network), therefore we expect that this 
variable strengthen the role of Partnreq in explaining the investments decisions. Analogously, we expect 
that Asl  is associated with Law, being the public Health related to legislation. Adv is here intended as a 
free source of information, vehiculating a zero cost information. With Other entrepreneur we thus 
capture the horizontal exchange of information, mainly channelled in the networks relationships (Omta 
et al., 2001). The information considered here concerns with the technology and the related risks. A 
positive effect of these variables would indicate that the source influences the probability to invest. 
With Control variables we account for variable which may be supposed to influence the decision to 
invest, but that are not related to the decision to allocate the decision right to invest. Shaosheng et al. 
(2008), Yapp and Fairman (2006), Fulponi (2006) emphasize the importance of the experience of the 
entrepreneurs and managers to the end of adopting food safety systems. Both Ndir  and Experience are 
intended to account for the capability – based upon tacit knowledge -  to cope with technological 
uncertainty and then to invest.  
Scholars underlines the role of the size of the business in adopting food safety systems. Loader and 
Hobbs (1999) argue that the legislation can charge small firm of larger costs because of the lack of 
economies of scale. Trienekens and Zuurbider (2008) underlines the difficulties of small firms to comply. 
Scale is also invoked to account for different impact and technological risks and well as difference in the 
class of operations. These differences would be so marked to require different approaches at the 
various scale of business  (Delind  and Howard, 2008). We therefore introduced the variable  Sales  in 
order to account for the influence of scale. The variable Prod, finally, is considered to account for the 
potentially different behaviour in units specialized in trade with respect to those engaged in production 
or also in production. 
3.4 Empirical results  
177 questionnaires were filled and returned back (response rate: 8.89%).  Among these questionnaires, 
117 provided the data used in the present study. The remaining were incomplete and lacking some of 
the variables needed. The Table 3 illustrates the characteristics of the sample data.  
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Table 3. 
General characteristics of the sample 
  
Variables  
    
Managers (n. units) 409 
Technicians (n. units) 818 
Employers (n. units) 77 
Skilled workers (n. units) 1988 
Generic workers (n. units) 9923 
  
Age of top manager (years)  
≤ 30 9 
31-50 81 
> 50 89 
  
Education of the top manager  
Elementary school 20 
Junior High School 52 
High School 93 
University Degree 13 
  
Job experience of the top manager (years)  
≤ 5 9 
6-15 21 
16-25 49 
>25 99 
  
Branch of activity (n.units)  
Production 47 
Trade 97 
Production and trade 33 
    
Source: the Authors  
 
The sample is characterized by a small presence of skilled workers and technicians. The age of the top 
managers is of medium or high level. There is a really small percentage of managers with an University 
degree. This fact could appear to be compensated by the prevalence of large work experience. The 
26.6% of the units investigated is specialized in production, the 18.6% in production and trade, whereas 
the 54% is specialized in trading activities. 
In the following we briefly illustrates and discuss the results concerning the selection hypothesis (sample 
selection bivariate probit models).   
Table 4 summarizes distribution of the drivers resulting from the questionnaires. The legislation 
pressure is the most influential drivers in Haccp and Traceability, but it maintains an important role also 
in Certification and Geographical Indications. Autonomy and Partners directions are prominent in 
Certification, Geographical indications and Brand, with an evident role for the allocation of decision 
rights to the transaction counterparties.  
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Table 4. 
Distribution of drivers by safety systems 
         
System Law Autonomy Partner directions 
    Haccp 72.7 25.0 2.3 
Certification 22.5 69.0 8.5 
Geographical Indications 27.3 63.6 9.1 
Brand 14.0 76.7 9.3 
Trace 57.4 39.0 3.7 
        
Source: the Authors 
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Table 5 (Part I). 
Bivariate sample election models 
              
  HACCP   Certification    Geographical Indications            Private Brand  Traceability  
 PR_Haccp HR_Haccp CO_Haccp PR_Cert HR_Cert CO_Cert HR_Gi CO_Gi HR_Brand CO_Brand PR_Trace HR_Trace CO_Trace 
                            
MAIN              
Law_Haccp 1.037*** 0.727*** 0.276           
Auton_Haccp 0.211 0.0451 -0.202           
Partndir_Haccp 8.117 -8.669 10.55           
Law_Cert    12.184*** -6.220*** 1.102**        
Auton_Cert    6.627*** 0.833*** 0.564**        
Partndir_Cert    6.6753*** 0.613*** 1.046*        
Law_Gi       -4.169 7.418      
Auton_GI       0.511 0.693*      
Partndir_Gi       - -3.785      
Law_Brand         -1.914*** 0.666    
Auton_Brand         0.48 0.354** *   
Partndir_Brand         -2.176** 0.615    
Law_Trace           0.786* 0.437*** -3.745 
Auton_Trace           0.163 0.442*** 0.0542 
Partndir_Trace           8.460 -4915*** -4.294 
_cons   0.634*** -5.822*** -1.518***      -1.285**  0.962 
              
                            
Change              
Law -0.311 0.241 -0.0631 0.191 0.0703 0.217 -0.1083627 -0.208 -0.143 -0.274 -0.0892 -0.214 0.0558 
Custom -0.315* -0.136 -0.452*** -0.232 -0.171 -0.184 -0.3853*** -0.315* -0.352*** -0.427** *    -0.425** -0.174 -0.392** 
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Table 5 (part II). 
Bivariate sample election models 
              
  HACCP   Certification  
  Geographical 
Indications            Private Brand  Traceability  
 PR_Haccp HR_Haccp CO_Haccp PR_Cert HR_Cert CO_Cert HR_Gi CO_Gi HR_Brand CO_Brand PR_Trace HR_Trace CO_Trace 
                            
Price 0.266* 0.0902 0.302** 0.214* 0.244 0.197 0.26117** 0.283* 0.276*** 0.380** 0.222 0.102 0.248* 
Tech 0.0771 0.251 -0.0694 0.339 0.452 0.563 0.1593706 0.0958 0.0604 0.024 -0.0646 -0.111 0.367 
Asl 0.709 0.992 0.37 1.049** 1.303*** 1.050 0.3638364 0.756 0.298 0.475 0.494 0.641* 0.896 
PublAdv 0.0868 0.364* 0.0932 0.134 0.0376 -0.0759 0.1298488 0.0162 0.24 0.0877 -0.0163 0.183 0.218 
Enterpr 0.349 0.423 0.676* 0.348 0.372 0.672* 0.2991006 0.404 0.159 0.482 0.618* 0.661*** 0.649* 
Ndir -0.0107 -0.00473 -0.00281 -0.00878 -0.0125* -0.00539 
-
0.01106** -0.0094 -0.0108* -0.0104 -0.0052 -0.009*** -0.0057 
Sales 
-
0.0000051 -1.51E-06 -2.71E-07 -7.32E-07 -5.54E-06 -2.38E-06 -4.33E-06 -5.55E-06 -10.24 -5.22E-07 -2.72E-06 -7.39-06** -2.74E-06 
Exper 0.000328 0.00744 -0.00374 0.0131** 0.0152 0.00933 
-
0.0011764 -0.00415 0.00115 0.00267 -0.00292 -0.0026 0.098 
_cons   -2.398*   -2.324* -2.568** -2.554*             -1.840 
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Wald  2 19.03 5.13+e12 1989.77 . 1.6+e11 19.97 1.97 3.6 2.39 199.39 6.82 112860.46 0.8 
Prob > 2 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0020 0.3700 0.3000 0.4900 0.0000 0.0800 0.0000 0.8500 
 -0.793 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 1.000 1.000 0.935 -0.939 -0.883 -1.000 1.000 -1.000 -0.696 
2 4.17 0.19 5.42 165.55 6.67 40.53 106.43 29.34 10.67 35.46 8.55 7.86 0.5 
Prob > 2 0.0410 0.6700 0.0200 0.0000 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0035 0.0050 0.4770 
* p<0.05, * * p<0.01, ** * p<0.001            
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The Table 5 illustrate the estimates for the sample selection bivariate probit model.  
The selection hypothesis holds for all the systems considered except than in the case of investment in 
Human resources for Haccp (HR_Haccp) and in Additional costs for traceability (CO_Trace). In the 
following we provide details about the statistical results paying attention to the selection hypothesis, 
the statistical significance of the coefficients estimated. 
Haccp  
The driver Law_Haccp is explains the investments decisions both for Physical and Human Resources. 
Among the beliefs variables, only the duty to comply with the law (Law) and the expectations about the 
increase of clients and sales (Custom) have an explaining capacity in the case of CO_Haccp, while only 
Adv is significant in the case of HR_Haccp. Enterpr  explains the investments in Additional Costs 
emphasizing the importance of horizontal relationships. The influence of legislation is evident and it is 
associated with the expectations having a clear private economic sense. This results reflects the 
literature achievements (Trienekens, Zuurbider, 2008; Loader, Hobbs, 1999; Gorris; 2005; Lupien, 2005). 
Certification  
All the drivers considered contributes to explain the investments decisions. The change  equation 
estimates provide a more articulated picture. Price expectations, health authority information (Asl) and 
the experience of the managers (Exper) are significant in the case of the investments in Physical 
resources. Asl and Ndir are influential in the  
case of the Human resources, but only the coefficient of Enterpr  is statistically significant in the case of 
the investments in Additional Costs. 
Geographical Indications 
Only the coefficient of Auton-Gi is statistically significant for the Geographical indications system in the 
case of investments in Additional Costs. Among the beliefs  considered Law and Price  have significant 
coefficient for the investment in Human Resources  and Additional Costs for Geographical indications. 
The control variable Ndir is significant in the model for HR_Gi. 
Brand 
While Law and Partners directions have significant coefficients in the case of HR_Brand, the driver 
Autonomy  is significant in the case of CO_brand. The belief Custom and Price  are influential in both the 
two models, but only the control variable Ndir  has a significant coefficient and only for HR_Brand.  
Traceability  
The driver is significant in the case of the Physical resources, while all the three drivers are significant in 
the case of the Human resources investments. For the change equation, the expectation custom  and 
the information from the other entrepreneurs (Entepr) have significant coefficient for Physical 
resources, Human resources and Additional Costs. Among the control variables Ndir and Sales  have 
significant coefficient in the case of Human resources investments. 
The results delineate a complex picture of the influence of the allocation of the decision right to invest. 
Certification is a clear case of common influence of the three drivers, in such a case the public 
intervention and the private strategies combine themselves in a convergent manner for physical 
resources. In the case of Human resources the legislation pressure has a negative, divergent influence. 
This indicates that the presence  is directed toward physical resources and additional costs. Although 
the Human resources are relevant to safety outcomes, the legislation pressure has a positive influence 
because investments are usually idiosyncratic (Williamson, 1985) and this strengthen the coordination 
(Martino, Perugini, 2006). Notably Autonomy  and partner directions are positive and convergent for all 
the three types of investments. The legislation influence is of particular importance in Haccp, the mostly 
diffused system (Yapp, Fairman, 2006; Henson, Holt, 2000). The explaining capacity of the Beliefs  is 
mostly evident in the remaining four systems, in which the free choice of the partion is normally more 
pronounced. The explaining contribution of the source of information is not evident. Notably the 
horizontal relationships are important in the case of Traceability, which rests on the contact among the 
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chain stages. The Ndir confirms the importance of knowledge to design and to implement food safety 
strategy. We have to point out that there is not an evidence for the role of size, despite the indications 
of literature. In synthesis our results indicates a large explaining capacity of an approach based upon the 
analysis of the allocation of the decision right to invest. 
After having delineated the patterns of explanation, a natural step is to examine the impact of the 
drivers on the decision to invest (Greene, 2008). The Table 6 summarizes the average marginal effects 
(AMEs) estimated for the drivers of the outcome equation: the AMEs indicate how change the 
probability to invest under the inducement of the driver considered. They are estimated for all the units 
of the sample and then the average value is calculated.  
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Table 6. 
Sample selection bivariate probit models - Average Marginal Effects  by systems 
                 
                               
Drive
rs  HACCP   
Certificati
on  
Gegraphical 
Indication   Brand   
Traceab
ility  
                
  
PR_HACC
P 
HR_HACC
P 
CO_HACC
P 
PR_CER
T HR_CERT CO_CERT 
PR_
GI HR_GI CO_GI 
PR_BR
AND 
HR_BR
AND 
CO_BRAN
D 
PR_TRAC
E 
HR_TRA
CE 
CO_TRAC
E 
                
                
Law 
0.330841
1*** 
0.258092
8*** 
0.213173
8 
0.17676
17 
-
0.148679
2 
0.300714
9*** - 
-
0.267
* 
0.477906
4*** - 
-
0.490*
** 
0.233377
4*** 
0.224593
2** 
0.15057
24 
-
0.104500
8 
 (2.46) (16.68) (1.38) (1.73) -(0.02) (5.73) - (0,10) (0.03) - (0.00) (0.01) (2.11) (0.00) -(0.68) 
                
                
Auto
n 
0.050485
9 
0.014062
6 0.054774 
0.26677
22* 
0.162783
6** 
0.190323
*** - 
0,083
*** 
0.238485
3 - 0.189 
0.134996
7*** 
0.050196
2 
0.14596
76 
0.015767
7 
 (0.39) (0.10) (0.40) (1.13) (1.94) (3.34) - (0.00) (1.91) - (0.12) (0.01) (0.43) (0.00) (0.11) 
                
                
Partn
dir 
0.203054
6 
-
0.717861
7*** 
0.306265
4***  
0.143411
2*** 
0.271460
8*** - 0-375 
-
0.504545
1 - -0.496 
0.216565
3*** 
0.371002
6*** 
-
0.68128
65 
-
0.764594
5*** 
 (1.51) -(8.92) (2.28)  (18.40) (3.43) - 
(0.015
) -(0.16) - (0.00) (0.01) (21.31) (0.00) -(2.80) 
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Haccp 
In the model regarding the Haccp system the driver Law  has a positive impact on the investment on 
Physical, Human resources and Additional costs. The probability of investing in physical resources 
supporting Haccp increases by 0.339, and the probability of investing in Human resources also increase 
but only by 0.254. The increasing is small than in the case of CO_Haccp (0.080). The Partners directions  
act as a drivers increasing the probability to invest in Physical resource by 0.552 and by 0.303 the 
probability in the case of Additional Costs, and reducing by -0.718 the probability of investing in Human 
resources. Therefore we point out that while Law  has a similar influence on both physical and human 
resources, the Partner direction has a different influence on the investment in Physical resources, 
Human resources and Additional costs. The emerging picture indicates that no autonomous decisions 
drive the invest in Haccp system. 
Certification 
All the three drivers have an impact on all the types of investments in the case of the certification 
system. The Law  increase the probability to invest in physical resources by 0.787 and by 0.301 in 
additional costs, but it reduces the probability to invest in the case of Human resource (-0.208). The 
impact of Auton  on physical resources is positive and smaller than that of law and Partner directions for 
Physical resources and additional Costs, but larger for Human resources. The probability to invest in 
human resource is reduce by the Law (-0.208) whereas both the Autonomy and Partners directions 
increase it. The impact of Law  on the investment in additional costs is larger of the autonomous 
decisions and about equal to that of the decisions made by the chain partners. Therefore the 
certification system involves a complex allocation of the decision rights along the chain. The first reason 
for that is the mandatory and voluntary certification schemes co-exist in the sector examined. The can 
also be explained by the evidence that certification requires a strict monitoring of the production 
process entailing then the combination of autonomous and partners decisions. Furthermore we note 
that, while the decisions of parties tend to increase the probabilities of all the types of investments, the 
Law  does not promote the investment in human resources. This point is relevant because, while it 
reflects the policy inducement to increase  costs (Henson, Reordan, 2000), it clearly contradicts the 
necessity of sustaining safety strategies with adequate skills and human competences (Yapp, Fairman, 
2006; FUlponi, 2006; Gorris, 2005).  
Geographical indications 
The discussion of the case of Geographical indication can just concerns the model for invest in the 
Human resource (-0.552) and additional costs investments (0.601). Notably, we see that the driver Law 
reduces the probability to invest in Human resources but increases the probability if investing in 
additional costs. This would suggest that the legal framework tends to charge specific additional costs 
on the participants to the systems, confirming the existing evidence (Belleti et al…). On the other hand 
also the Autonomy decision has a similar effect on Additional costs even though it is weaker.  
Brand 
The probability to invest in Human resources increases under Law inducements but strongly decreases 
with Partndir n the case of Brand system, suggesting a prevalence of the legal framework which limits 
the importance of Brand opportunistic relations. 
Traceability 
The AME of Law is 0.235 in the case of traceability system. The allocation of the decision rights to the 
transaction counterparty also reduces the probability to invest in additional costs, indicating that the 
chain relationships may entail efficient approaches to that safety system. 
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4 Final remarks 
The study addressed the question of how much law compliance and economic and organizational goals 
determine food safety investments. We focus on inducements to invest due to the necessity to comply 
with the law, to the individual free economic convenience and particularly on the allocation of critical 
decision rights to the party who is expected to be able to maximize the relationship total surplus. The 
decision to allocate the decision rights appear to be able to influence the choice of the investments as 
well as the remaining two drivers. The evidence indicates that the decision rights perspective is 
meaningful in order to investigate how public and private activities combine themselves in food safety 
provision. Furthermore, the role of public regulation (law) is concentrated in terms of food systems and 
types of resources. The allocation of decision right to the counterparty is evident, thus there is also a 
confirm of this organizational solution, as predicted by theory,  This evidence contributes to shed light 
on the strength of the coordination devices associated by safety strategies.  
The study presents two main limits. First, the association among the drivers entails both substitution 
and complementarity among the investments, but our method does not allow for discriminating these 
facts. A specific approach should me carried out (REF). The second limits derives from the fact the our 
questionnaires did not provide any information about the allocation of decision rights to collective 
bodies, which instead pay a role in many of the systems considered. 
The knowledge of the pattern of influence may contribute to design public and private policies aimed at 
increasing the degree of product safety. 
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